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We develop a formal system to reason about knowledge properties of quantum security protocols. The
formalism is obtained via a marriage of measurement calculus [3], an algebraic framework for measurement-
based quantum computing [7], with the algebra of epistemic actions and their appearance maps [1, 8].
Measurement calculus has also proven to be a proper language to describe and to analyse distributed
quantum protocols [4]. Protocols (here referred to as measurement pattern) are described by a combina-
tion of commands: 1-qubit preparations Ni (prepares qubit i in state |+〉i), 2-qubit entanglement operators
Eij := ∧Zij (controlled-Z operator), 1-qubit measurementsMαi , and 1-qubit Pauli corrections Xi and Zi,
where i, j represent the qubits on which each of these operations apply, and α ∈ [0, 2pi). Measurement
Mαi is defined by orthogonal projections P
|+α〉
i (with outcome si = 0) and P
|−α〉
i (with outcome si = 1).
1
Dependent corrections, used to control non-determinism, will be written Xsji and Z
sj
i , with X
0
i = Z
0
i = I ,
X1i = Xi, and Z
1
i = Zi. Any pattern can be put in a standard form, where all the preparation and entangle-
ment can be done first, followed by local measurements and corrections and classical communications. The
initial entanglement state is the distributed global memory shared among the agents at the beginning of the
protocol and the classical outcome of measurements represents the classical communication of agents.
The starting point is our main result that proves the well-defined measurement patterns with flow [2]
form a quantale Q. Recall that a quantale is a sup-monoid (Q,≤,∨, •, ) where in our case the monoid
multiplication is the sequential composition (or juxtaposition) of measurement pattern commands. In the
fragment of measurement patterns with flow, probabilities of each branch of measurement are equal, as
a result a measurement can be written as the non-deterministic choice of its projections, that is Mαi =
P
|+α〉
i ∨ P |−α〉i . The induced order is the non-deterministic order of information between each projection
of the measurement, that is P |+α〉i ≤ Mαi and P |−α〉i ≤ Mαi . We add agents A ∈ A to our quantale by
endowing it with a family of lax quantale endomorphisms fQA : Q → Q, one for each agent A ∈ A. We
interpret fQA (q) as appearance of agent A about action q, that is all the actions that agent A considers as
happening when action q is happening in reality. Since fQA preserves all joins, it has a Galois right adjoints
that preserves all meets. The adjunction is denoted by fQA a 2QA and we read 2QA q as ‘agent A knows that
action q is happening’. These maps and their relation to the traditional notions of knowledge and belief in
epistemic logic have been studied in [1, 8].
Each action has an owner that generates the action, we encode the owner as the map gen : Q → A and
whenever gen(q) = Q, we use the shorthand qA. For example, the generator of an entanglement action is
the source that creates the entangled state. In this case, we distinguish the agents that share the state from the
source via the shorthand EC,A,Bi,j where inv(E
C,A,B
i,j ) = (A,B), gen(E
C,A,B
i,j ) = C and inv : Q → A×A
is defined partially on the entanglement actions. We use these maps to assign appearances to action for each
agent. For instance, all actions appear as identity to their generators, that is fA(M
α,A
i ) = M
α,A
i .
We assume that the right module M of our quantale Q is the lattice of results of measurements. The
action of the quantale on the module−·− : M ×Q→M stands for the change of the state of a system as a
1Here |±α〉 stand for 1√2 (|0〉 ± eiα|1〉).
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result of a measurement pattern. The Galois right adjoint to this operation on its first argument − · q a [q]−
is the dynamic modality or the weakest precondition of Hoare logic. Similar to the Q, We endow M
with a family of join preserving maps fMA : M → M and interpret them as appearance of agents about
results of measurements. The pair (fMA , f
Q
A ) is moreover asked to be a lax system endomorphism. We
call the whole formalism (M,Q, {(fMA , fQA )}A∈A) an epistemic measurment system, built on the notion of
epistemic systems defined in [1, 8].
Ekert’91. As an example, we encode and reason about the Ekert’91 protocol [6] and an attack on it. The
measurement pattern of the protocol is as follows
Ek := (s4!B)(s3!A)(M
B,s4(
pi
2
)
2 M
B,pi
2
4 N4M
A,s3(
pi
2
)
1 M
A,pi
2
3 N
A
3 )E
C,A,B
1,2
where x! is the public announcement of x in a classical channel. We show that for s1 and s2, the results
of measurements on qbits 1 and 2 respectively, if the source of entanglement is trustable and the protocol
is successful, i.e. s3 = s4, then agents A and B share a secret. Sharing is expressed via the following
inequalities (leading to common knowledge between A,B), e.g. the fist one says that after a successful run
of the protocol, A knows the result of B’s measurement:
> ≤ [Ek]2A s2, > ≤ [Ek]2B s1, > ≤ [Ek]2B2As2, > ≤ [Ek]2A2B s1
Secrecy is expressed via the following inequalities for all other agentsX 6= A,B, e.g. after a successful run
of the protocol, X does not know the result of A and B’s measurements and A and B are aware of this:
> ≤ [Ek]¬2X s1, > ≤ [Ek]¬2X s2, > ≤ [Ek]2A¬2X s1, > ≤ [Ek]2B¬2X s2
However, if the source of entanglement is not trustable we can show the opposite of above properties, e.g.
> ≤ [Ek]¬2A s2, > ≤ [Ek]¬2B s1
Related and Future Work. Another attempt to use measurement calculus to reason about properties of
distributed quantum protocols has been originated in [4] and further elaborated on in [5]. Our approach
differs from these in that we work in an algebraic, rather than relational, setting and moreover our knowledge
is not based on the equivalence of states. As a consequence we can also reason about misinformation actions
such as the faulty Bell pair in the attack to the Ekert protocol. As future work, we aim at analyzing further
examples to demonstrate the powers and limitations of our approach. We would like to investigate how our
right module is generated, for example as the lattice of closed subspaces of the Hilbert space consisting
of the tensor product of the systems involved in a protocol. The generalization of appearance maps to the
minimal and canonical join to reason about the general class of quantum key distribution protocols is our
other aim. Finally, we would like to implement our algebra as a mechanized software tool.
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